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Abstract
Main requirement of recent computing environments,
like mobile and then ubiquitous computing, is to adapt ap-
plications to context. On the other hand, access control gen-
erally trust users once they have authenticated, despite the
fact that they may reach unauthorized situations. We anal-
yse how dynamic information can be used to improve secu-
rity in the authorization process, especially in the case of
asynchronous communications, like messaging or eventing.
We experiment and validate our approach using context as
an authorization factor for eventing in Web service for de-
vice (like UPnP or DPWS) 1.
1. Introduction
Ubiquitous computing, under the leadership of Mark
Weiser’s vision [14], has made computing evolve toward
multi-device, multi-user, and highly dynamic environments.
Miniaturization of hardware and new wireless communica-
tion networks have created new devices, worn by users or
surrounding them. Due to mobility, devices appear and dis-
appear frequently in such environments.
The major concern in ubiquitous or pervasive comput-
ing is adapting applications to users surroundings, and more
generally, to their context. In this paper, we focus on lim-
iting communications between entities that are in the same
context, for security purposes. Indeed, information involved
in ubiquitous computing communications is often privacy-
sensitive, and we want to make sure it cannot be received or
intercepted by non-authorized entities.
Access control [12] relies on and coexists with authenti-
cation, authorization and audit. Authentication can be made
on information or persons: it establishes who issued a piece
of information, or confirms the identity of a person. How-
ever, to ensure that the identity is correct, different authen-
tication factors may be used. If the person possesses the
1This work is part of the Continuum Project (French Research Agency)
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information related to each factor, it is assumed that this is
the pretended person.
Authorization takes places after the authentication phase,
to grant a principal access to the controlled system. We will
study in the following section that authorization is most of-
ten static and made one time, leading the users to be consid-
ered authorized for a long time. With context changes we
cannot assume that a user is authorized throughout the dura-
tion of the use of an application, even if he is still identified.
We will then explore works on dynamic authorization.
2. Authorization
To extend authorization in order to use dynamic informa-
tion, we study how it has been handled in different systems.
It appears that there are three types of authorization: static,
quasi-static, and dynamic.
2.1. Static authorization
Historically, access control used static credentials to con-
firm user identity and was made only when entering the sys-
tem. For example, the login phase of an operating system
needs a login and a password to authenticate a user, and is
made only when he logs in. It can also be an ID card, a
fingerprint pattern, or an identification token. Infrastructure
information is sometimes used to authenticate users. For ex-
ample, the Network File System (NFS) access control uses,
in its default configuration, the IP address of a client to grant
him access, as long as he still uses the file system.
Wemodel the access control process with state diagrams.
In Figure 1, a user wants to use a system, and he has to au-
thenticate himself in the first place. Since this is static au-
thorization, if authentication is correct and matches an au-
thorization rule, he stays authorized and considered trusted
until he logs off.
2.2. Quasi-static authorization
Almost ten years ago, static information for authenti-
cation and authorization began to be seen as a limitation
Figure 1. Static authorization
in several domains. In distributed computing for example,
with Cholewka et al. [3], the task being done could affect
access control on some objects. The task was extracted from
the workflow of the application, and this dynamic informa-
tion was considered to be the context of the application.
Later popularized by Web applications, session manage-
ment has emphasized what we call quasi-static authoriza-
tion. In these systems, credentials are rarely changed com-
pared to the lifespan of an application. Authorization is
made at first access of the system, and periodically renewed
to keep users authorized in case of information change in
authentication or authorization information. This mecha-
nism is called leasing, and often used in publish/subscribe
systems. We modelled it in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Quasi-static authorization
It is quite similar to the static authorization diagram,
except that a loop appears between authorized and not-
authorized states. Whenever the lease expires, the user has
to be authorized again to return in trusted state.
Quasi-static authorization prevents users from being
connected to a system forever. A password change, or the
introduction of a new authentication factor in the access
control system would finally lead to the reevaluation of the
authorization when the application decides it. As an ex-
ample of such system in industry, we can cite Mobilegov
Access Control [11] that uses infrastructure-based authenti-
cation in addition to password based authentication for dif-
ferent kind of systems.
2.3. Dynamic authorization
Static authorization is also inadequate for ubiquitous
computing in which user’s context is an important concern,
and is already a part of applications. Not using contextual
information in security concerns could lead to granting a
user access without considering his condition [9]. Con-
textual information is highly dynamic, because the user is
likely to be moving, as much as other users in the same am-
bient space, with their attached devices. Sensors can also
be fixed in the physical infrastructure, like temperature or
light sensors. This dynamic information is used to inval-
idate user’s authorization, even if he is still identified by
standard authentication factors.
Thus, we introduce the dynamic authorization model for
environments in which it is needed to frequently check if
users are authorized due to changes in dynamic informa-
tion used for authorization. This open gates to consider-
ing highly dynamic contextual information to be used in the
access control process. As opposition to static and quasi-
static authorizations, dynamic authorization requires to be
rechecked according to changes in dynamic information.
It is necessary to dynamically modify access permissions
granted to users when context information changes. This
is twofold: users access privileges must change, as well as
resources must adjust their access permissions [9].
While in static and quasi-static authorization systems
users were trusted as long as they were logged in the system,
or after a timeout or lease time, with dynamic authorization,
it must be checked at each operation in the system. This can
be done in two ways:
• The first would be to reduce the lease time near zero,
and thus needing principals to authenticate and sub-
scribe all the time. Lease time has to be adapted to
system’s reactivity, which is around one second for
ubiquitous computing applications for example. This
is very inefficient and consequently a bad solution for
embedded devices populating ubiquitous computing
environments,
• The second, to be more efficient, would need the sys-
tem to know user’s context all along his use of the sys-
tem. In that case, the system could react on user’s con-
text changes by enforcing authorization policies to de-
termine if the user is still authorized and can be kept
or not the trusted area. We modelled this system in
Figure 3.
Figure 3. Event-driven dynamic authorization
With this second solution, trusted zone exit and re-entry
are context-driven. Since the dynamics of the context and
of the application are different, the access control process
is highly reactive. Quasi-static and static authorization pro-
cess, in contrast, were driven by the application. However,
new issues appear with dynamic authorization:
• How can contextual information be collected by the
security system? As a context-aware system, regular
contextual information collection can be done, using
context observers [4].
• How can it ensure that the information is authentic?
As stated Kindberg and Zhang, in their experience
in the location-aware mobile computing CoolTown
project [10]: when using contextual information for
access control, the authentication of the data itself
must be done. Indeed, dynamic data provided by sen-
sors can be simulated of falsified. If sensors are not
able to sign information, it has to be authenticated
when users collect it. A trusted observer has to col-
lect the same information than users in order to au-
thenticate it, and verify that it is this information that
is used by users to access the system. We will study
more deeply this question in section 4.
• What about privacy? Of course, placing a trusted en-
tity in users computing environment can be recusant.
Westin [15] defined privacy as “the ability to deter-
mine for ourselves when, how, and to what extent in-
formation about us is communicated to others”. If the
trusted entity describes precisely how contextual infor-
mation is used, it should be accepted by users.
A good example of such system are works of Bacon et
al., who introduce in [2] the OASIS (Open Architecture for
Securely Interworking Services) Role-Based Access Con-
trol. It uses credentials that a user possesses, along with side
conditions that depend on the state of the environment, to
authorize him to activate a number of roles. In their model,
they define that environmental predicates can be used for
environmental constraints or context-sensitive information.
Environmental constraints can be checked by any entity in
the same environment than the application, thus dynamic
information used for authorization can be authenticated.
2.4. Synthesis
The Table 1 summarizes the types of authorization and
information used for authentication.
Identity and infrastructure represent principals informa-
tion commonly used. Infrastructure and environment repre-
sent contextual information that can be used. User infras-
tructure is populated by all computing equipments that are
in the context of the user, like local and remote devices. En-
vironment and system infrastructure gather all information
that can be get by anyone or do not depend on the infras-
tructure of the user which has to be authenticated. Date and
time are obviously considered as a part of the environment.
In some cases [7, 10], location and speed can be considered
as a part of the system infrastructure because sensors are
part of the security system’s domain, and thus can be easily
verified.
Table 1. Classification of authorization factors
dynamicity
Static or Dynamic
quasi-static
Identity Operating
Systems login
?
User infras-
tructure
Mobilegov
AC R©
?
System infras-
tructure and
environment
NFS OASIS[2],
CSAC [7]
Our research has proved that there is no project that uses
dynamic information for authorization which is not cap-
tured inside the domain of the security system, like infor-
mation from users devices or sensors available inside the
context of the user.
3. Access control in communications
paradigms
In this section, we focus on how access control is ap-
plied to synchronous and asynchronous communications.
We consider two entities, A and B, A being granted by B.
3.1. Synchronous communications
Synchronous communications represent a class of com-
munication paradigms that need communicating parties to
be present at the same time, and thus be aware of the pres-
ence of each other. The most representative example is re-
quest/response mode, which can be used locally in function
call, or remotely with RPC (Remote Procedure Call).
When A invokes some method of B, we need to check
if A is authorized to access this service and thus the infor-
mation returned by B. A has to authenticate itself to B if it
wants the request to be processed and response returned. If
authentication fails, the request can be dropped or rejected.
We model these different states in Figure 4.
Enabling dynamic authorization in synchronous commu-
nications can easily be done at request time, since A has in
any case to send a message to B to receive the response
message.
Figure 4. Synchronous communication ac-
cess control
3.2. Asynchronous communications
Asynchronous communications can take many forms.
They decouple in synchronization, and sometimes in space
and time the communication between two entities [5]. They
are fundamentally based on messages, like JMS (Java Mes-
saging System), an example message-oriented middleware.
Communication scheme that use such asynchronous com-
munications are asynchronous procedure call and eventing,
with for example publish/subscribe patterns.
Asynchronous method invocation fromA toB delays re-
sponse with a callback to A so that it does not have to wait
for the response. We decompose this protocol as two mes-
sage sending: the first from A to request method execution,
and the second from B to give a result when the execution
has completed. Reactivity is added to the system, since A is
not actively waiting, but notified.
Asynchronous communications can also be pure event-
ing systems, that send messages only in one way, and gener-
ally to many recipients. Publish/subscribe systems [5] use
event notifications to send information to subscribed enti-
ties. They are fully decoupled: data providers publish topics
or content types, to which consumers subscribe. Providers
produce events regardless if there are some subscriptions,
they are generally not in charge of the delivering process.
The subscription is a synchronous process, like a
request-response pattern. It is used by consumers to reg-
ister their interest to a specific event channel and to give
information about the connection that will be used to send
events.
Figure 5. Asynchronous communication ac-
cess control
However, since following interactions are only one way
messages, like events notifications, authorization of the re-
cipient cannot be verified. For static authorization, as we
have seen, this is not a problem because after subscription,
his credentials are not supposed to change or it is not im-
portant for system security. With quasi-static authorization,
the subscription is accepted only for a defined validity time:
the lease. Subscriber is trusted only for this time, and has to
renew his subscription and authorization, before the end of
the lease, to avoid a service interruption. This is modelled
in Figure 5: A subscribes and authenticates toB, which will
allow A to receive notifications from B.
What can be done for dynamic authorization of the re-
cipient in asynchronous communications? Bacon et al. [1]
already explored access control in publish/subscribe sys-
tems, for large scale architectures with multiple administra-
tion domains. They use a dedicated security infrastructure
for credential management (OASIS RBAC [2]), and access
control applies only to event brokers. Their solution is thus
based on managing security through a layer lower than the
application layer, which is the transport layer.
In the next section, we describe our contribution, how
we handle dynamic access control for asynchronous com-
munications recipients, in the application layer, and without
needing a specific infrastructure for security purposes.
4. Context-based dynamic authorization
We have seen that in context-sensitive computing, static
or quasi-static authorization cannot be used alone because
some contexts are not compatible with the authorization
granted in first place. We also have seen that an efficient
solution would require a trusted entity from the security sys-
tem to be placed in users’ context to ensure the authentica-
tion of dynamic information used for access control. We
present our solution, first as a model (4.1), then as an im-
plementation (4.2).
4.1. Model
As depicted in Figure 6, the publisher B sends A mes-
sages. Rounds tagged with Obi represent context observers
in A’s context. To keep things as simple as possible, we
consider that they both act as sensor information observer
for A and B, and that they are trusted entities to B. The
problem is described as follows: when B sends a one-way
message to A, how can it ensure that A is in a context in
agreement with B’s policy for recipients?
Our contribution is to dynamically add trusted context
observers in the context of the subscriber, that notify the
publisher from changes in contextual information that are
used for end-to-end access control.
Moreover, since most observers Obi provide contextual
information related to a specific information on the near en-
vironment of A, they may vary along with user moves and
changes in the infrastructure. Access control rules can thus
be adapted to users’ context, based on which observers are
Figure 6. Asynchronous communication and
contexts
currently part of users’ infrastructure. Figure 7 models the
authorization process based on observer information. Once
principal is authenticated, its authorization status is bound
to the status of validity of observer information.
Figure 7. Authorization based on dynamic in-
formation with observers
When observers are present, authenticated, and that the
value of the contextual information they provide corre-
sponds to an authorized value, the access is granted. As ex-
ample, the authorization computation is kept simple, based
only on equalities between collected information of three
observers and information known as valid by the access
control system. We can express the authorization process
with a logic rule: grant ≡ Ob1∧Ob2∧Ob3∧valid(Ob1)∧
valid(Ob2) ∧ valid(Ob3). If all observers are present, and
that the information they provide is valid, access is granted.
As opposite, as soon as an observer information becomes
unmet, a granted access is revoked: denial ≡ ¬Ob1 ∨
¬Ob2∨¬Ob3∨¬valid(Ob1)∨¬valid(Ob2)∨¬valid(Ob3).
These rules are written as part of the authorization pro-
cess to grant access to users. Several rules should exist
for one user, each using different observers. This allows
to grant users access based on contextual information while
they evolve in not already known environments. Rules are
evaluated depending on which observers are available.
4.2. Application for eventing in Service for Device
We chose to implement this solution with two specific
architectures and paradigms: Web service for device for the
software infrastructure, and publish/subscribe systems for
asynchronous communication. Reasons of these choices re-
volve around one concept: ubiquitous computing.
For many years, service oriented architectures (SOA)
have been used in home automation, mobile, pervasive and
ubiquitous computing to represent as services the sets of
functionalities offered by devices. They offer lots of fea-
tures discussed in [13] such as encapsulation, dynamic-
ity, discoverability and interoperability. They evolved from
standard SOA to SOA for device (SOAD) by adding two
main features: decentralized reactive discovery and asyn-
chronous communications.
Decentralized reactive discovery has been popularized
by projects such as SLP 2 or Jini. They suppress the need of
a service registry tracking all services active in a network
domain. They use multicasted or broadcasted messages
to notify that services appear or disappear. Asynchronous
communications used by SOAD like Jini are events in a
publish/subscribe scheme.
These evolutions allow to create reactive dynamic dis-
tributed applications, suitable for ubiquitous computing en-
vironments. In addition, when Web technologies are used
to implement SOAD, interoperability between all entities
is enabled, whether they are heterogeneous devices or sim-
ple software services. Only two implementations of Web
services for devices currently exist: UPnP 3 and DPWS 4.
UPnP has been created by the UPnP Forum, under the lead-
ership of Microsoft in 1999. It has never be standardized,
but is used in many objects of everyday life, like home gate-
ways, or media centers. DPWS appeared in 2004, as a re-
placement for UPnP, and as a technology based on Web ser-
vices standards, like WS-Discovery or WS-Eventing.
Publish/subscribe systems use 1 → N communication
scheme: a publisher is able to accept several subscriptions
from different clients. Thus, all consumers are notified
when issuing an event. This feature will require that ob-
servers are managed for each subscriber to the eventing
channel, and not simply for each eventing channel.
Service for device composition. To create applications
from this infrastructure of services for devices, we use the
Service Lightweight Component Architecture (SLCA) [6].
It dynamically orchestrates and composes services for de-
vices using lightweight components. Components are
called lightweight because they execute in the same mem-
ory addressing space, the same process, and the same com-
ponent container. The container provides the least possible
technical services, also known as non-functional concerns
helpers. Distribution has to be explicit.
Containers manage assemblies of components fully dy-
namically. Component types can be loaded and unloaded,
component instances and bindings between them can be
added or removed at run-time. Proxy components of Web
2The Service Location Protocol.
3Universal Plug and Play Forum: http://www.upnp.org/, June 2009
4Device Profile for Web Services. http://www.ws4d.org/, June 2009
services for devices are generated, loaded and instantiated
dynamically. Thus, we can follow the presence of such ser-
vice in a container, by adding or removing a proxy compo-
nent when the service appears or disappears.
Finally, containers can export functionalities created by
component assemblies as a new Web service for device us-
ing probe components. The hierarchy in the model thus uses
the service layer, allowing it to be distributed.
Composite service for device adaptation. Since compo-
sitions are based on lightweight components, service com-
positions are fully dynamic. A paradigm called Aspect
of Assembly [13] allows to adapt composite services ac-
cording to specified rules. Aspects of assembly are pieces
of information describing how an assembly of components
will be structurally modified. They consist of two parts,
like regular aspects found in Aspect-Oriented Programming
(AOP) [8]: pointcut and advice. Pointcuts describe to which
components the modification described by advices have to
be weaved (applied).
Moreover, aspects of assembly provide associativity,
commutativity and idempotence properties when several as-
pects are enabled to be weaved at the same time [13].
Implementation. The service for device infrastructure
and SLCA are used for all parts of the application: pub-
lisher, subscriber and observers. Observers can be trusted
entities from the publisher point of view thanks to dynamic
insertion of authentication components with aspects of as-
semblies.
The idea behind the use of lightweight components in
composite services is also to enable adapting non-functional
concerns at the same layer than the functional core of the
application. We use aspects of assembly in the publisher’s
and subscriber’s composite service to add the access con-
trol logic (Figure 8). Since we manage all concerns of the
application on the same layer, we cannot deal directly with
subscriptions handled by the underlying service infrastruc-
ture. We have to manage authorizations of all subscribers at
the application layer.
In Bacon works [1], group cryptography is used to ensure
confidentiality of events between trusted brokers. Encryp-
tion keys are updated when principals are declared unau-
thorized instead of when they unsubscribe, which makes
updates happen less frequently in this kind of environment.
We use the same technique to ensure that non-authorized
entities cannot receive messages.
Events are encrypted with a group key. When observers
notify the security system in the event producer, the group
key is changed. Modifications of the key are spread to the
subscribers of the event channel using the observers. In-
deed, since they are in subscribers’ context and they are
trusted parties, observers can safely deliver the new key.
Figure 8. Implementation using SLCA
Aspects of assembly allow us to manage different autho-
rization rules based on appearing and disappearing trusted
observers in the environment. Thanks to properties of as-
pects of assembly, we can enable several rules to be used
at the same time for dynamic authorization. Even if they
are enabled, they won’t apply until all observers needed by
the rule, defined in pointcuts, are present. The reactive dis-
covery process of Web service for device makes adaptation
of authorization rules reactive. This is useful in cases of
context overlappings and transitions, or simply to ensure
that access won’t be denied because of slight changes in
the highly dynamic infrastructure of ubiquitous computing.
4.3. Validation
We validate our contribution by three means: we cal-
culate the reactivity of the dynamic authorization process ;
we compare the number of message exchanged for the ac-
cess control process and the amount of unauthorized mes-
sages received with quasi-static authorization and with our
dynamic authorization.
The process of taking into account changes in contextual
information in the authorization involves several operations.
Hence, the time elapsed between the variation of a contex-
tual information and the modification of the authorization is
the time needed for those operations: data processing by the
observer (o), communication between the observer and the
proxy component of the event provider (c), and reprocessing
the authorization leading to a key change in the composite
authorization service (p). reaction time = o + c + p. o
and p are local data processing and take typically less than
1 ms to execute. c depends on how many hops there are be-
tween the subscriber and the event provider. In ubiquitous
computing, wireless networks are often used, so c may suf-
fer from an important variance. An average of 40 ms then
constitutes the predominent value of the reaction time.
In quasi-static authorization, like lease-based systems,
the value of the lease is several orders higher. The UPnP
specification for example recommends it to be at least half
an hour. In security aware systems though, it shouldn’t be
less than one minute to be efficient enough. The reaction
time would then be at most the value of the lease, since the
authorization is reenforced at the same time.
The number of messages used for the authorization pro-
cess in quasi-static authorization is periodically increased.
Indeed, the leased subscription makes those messages to be
send at every lease. Thus, this number follows a linear law,
function of the time spent using the system. In dynamic au-
thorization, messages are sent only when dynamic informa-
tion is modified. It can be higher than the linear number of
messages from quasi-static authorization if context changes
more often than the lease time. Else, it can be lower in num-
ber of message sent, but still more reactive.
The number of received non-authorized messages in dy-
namic authorization is zero. In quasi-static authorization,
depending on the rate of sent events and the length of the
lease, it can be very important.
5. Conclusion and trends
We have described a solution that allows dynamic autho-
rization policies based on dynamic information to be used to
manage asynchronous communications access control. Re-
active management of dynamic information changes makes
the solution efficient. Context is effectively an improvement
for access control systems in the authorization process.
Future works will study in what conditions the reactive
discovery used by service for device can be secured with
the implementation for publish/subscribe eventing we have
described. We will also experience how easily we can mod-
ify the dynamic information validation to handle inequality
operations, like ranges of values for context information in-
stead of equalities.
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